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AIR WAR OVER EUROPE
By KURT FISCHER
Here are "ome w:Jmical ddail<t and figuru on the air war ol1er Euro~ w1aii:1a
are ,wi utJ1leraUy known and ",Mch .how the ezlraordirwry proporlion8 tllu, war 00.
/U"umed dur;ng the hut fcw rrwriUa.. The auJlwr ~ a .taJ! rmmber of the t7lO11'ozine.
ON September 4, 1939, some fortyhours after Britain's declaration ofwar on the Reich, the British Air
Force dropped the first bombs on German
territory. This raid on Wilhelmshaven
and points 011 the lower Elbe was fol-
lowed by further British raid'i, chiefly on
Western Germany, during the Polish
campaign. Little damage was done, aud
it is probable that the raids were meant
only as a sop to the Poles. Another
series of attacks began in December 1939,
leading on January 12, 1940, to the
bombing of the seaside resort of Wester-
la.nd on the island of Sylt.
Iu May 1940 British raids increased in
number and severity, the first night
attack being carried out on May 10. By
the end of that month, the nwnber of
British raids on German territory had
mounted to 393, of which 276 had been
directed at nonmilitary objectives, claim-
ing more than fi ve hundred dead and
wounded among the civilian population.
This went on till June 20, without a
single German bomb having fallen on
British 80U-except for the silencing of a
coastal antiaircraft battery on March 16
during a German raid on Briti b warships
off the Orkney Islands-and without a
single British civilian or British home
having been hit. On June 20, 1940, the
Oerman High Command announced that
retaliatory attacks on military objectivC8
in the Briti h lsles had begun, although
still on a minor scu.le. The warning was
not heeded. The British air war against
t<,sidentilll quarters was continued, reach-
ing a ClinHI.X in eight raids on Berlin, the
first of which was carried out on August
26. Tho counterblow came in the night
from September 6 to 7, 1940, wh~n the
port and city of London shook for the
first time under the impact of a con-
centrated German bombing. Up to the
end of 1940, almost 45,000 tons of bombs
were dropped on Great Britain, of which
43,000 tons were explosive bombs and
1,600 tons incendiaries.
The fact that the British starteti the
bombing war is not as astounding as
might have seemed at first sight in view
of the patent inferiority of the British
Air Force, both in quantity and quality,
during the early stages of this war.
Bombing ha.d been resorted to by Britain
for almost two decades to uphold "Jaw
and order" throughollt the Empire.
During the Disarmament Conferences, the
British Government opposed all pro-
posals aimed at banning the bombing
weapon. And in a letter to the Editor
of The Timu, dated May 18, 1943, Lord
Winster contradicted the assertions of an
English newspaper that the air raids on
the dams of German rivers, which had
cost many civilian lives, had boon sug-
gested by a German refugee; he disclosed
that a committee for the selection of
bombing targets was formed years before
the outbreak of war.
The British contention that the Ger-
mans started the bombing war on civilians
by their attacks on Warsaw and Rotter-
dam is an attempt to sidetraok the issue,
for both these places were in the center
of military opemtions, were fortified and
defended by troops, and had refused
demands for capitulation.
The German campaigns in the Balkans
and against the Soviet Union relieved the
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British Isles of the immediate menace of
German bombing raids and spared the
British Air Force the heavy defensive
losses in men and material it had SUB-
tained up to March 1941. It was thus
able to train more personnel and increase
aircraft production. Yet the increase in
bomb-weight dropped on Germany and
the oc upied territories by the British
Air Force during 1941 and even 1942
was com paratively small.
Total Wclaht of Bombs Dropped by the
8rltlsh Air Force on the European
Continent
Ycar Tons
Ill~O 12.705
1041 31.185
104.2 45,285
Hence the British dropped the same
bomb load throughout 1942 as the Luft-
waffe had dropped in the second half of
1940.
Except for the coastal districts and
We tern Germany, the territory of the
Reich was not within the effective range
of the bomber types then at the disposal
of the RAF. American production was
lik w~'e not yet running at full speed
and, after December 8, 1941, it had also
to 611 the tremendously increased require-
ments of the US Army and Navy. More-
over, the new long-range bomber types
built in Britain and the USA had to
undergo many changes before they could
be proJuced in large numbers, while a
huge per"onnel to man them had also to
be trained. So it was not until 1943
that thc Allied bombing of the Continent
reached lL high pitch. During that year,
British planes alone dropped IG7, 165 tons
of bombs, to which must be added the
bomb load dropped by US formations.
Ameriean crews had taken part in bomb-
ing raills since July 4, 1942, but, laeking
fighting experience, they were at first
only sent out together with British-
ml\nn d planes in enterpris s with fighter
escort ~Lgaillst the occupicrl western ter-
ritori 8. Thcir first indepcndent opera-
tions did not begin until the end of 1942.
TirE BRITISH AT NiGHT-THE
.uI.ERIC.L"OS BY DAY
ince 1940 the British have, in their
raids again·t Reich territory, adhered to
the principle of attacking at night. This
seemed to assure their bomber formations
-which had to dispenso with fighter
escort-of adequate protection without
impeding their main purpose of spreading
terror through "area bombing." How-
ever, the gradual increase in the number
of German night fighters and the im-
provement in their tacties forced the
enemy frequently to change his methods.
At first, :British raids were carried out
preferably on moonlit nights, later on
dark nights, and recently there seems to
have been a predilection for bad-weather·
nights. Ideal conditions for a. British
night raid obtain whon the weather in
the British Isles favors starting and
landing, while there is an extended zone
of bad weather over the ontinent with
low, thick clouds. Above the clouds,
night bombers are comparatively safe
from night fighters, especially when the
latter must expect the formation of ice
on the wings.
A change is a.lso to be observed in the
tactics u ed by the British Air Force.
Up to the middle of 1942, the raids were
usually carried out in several waves,
each wave having to face the full force of
the antiaircraft fire. Ln.ter on, the Brit-
ish command attempted to get all at-
tacking planes over the target area within
the shortest possible time, echeloned in
height. This simultaneous mass attack
was to force the defenders to direct their
fire at varying rangel', thus reducing its
effectiveness. These "bomber stream"
tactics of flying in irregular yet joint
formn,tion, as well as various other
maneuvers, such as feint attacks, have
failed to cut down British losses.
The US Army Air Force, on the other
band, has been trained for daylight raids,
the better to be able to make out its
targets. Its theory was that heavily
armored and armed bombers flying in
close formation would need no fighter
escort and yet be virtually invulnerable.
But this proved erroneous. Notwith-
standing their armor and weapons, the
big American bombers suffered heavily.
ince the end of September 1943, their
formations have been protected by fight-
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Anglo-American Plane Losses Over Europe
(Dot lDclud1Da planee abot down o\·~r the Mediterranean battl~ frontal
The curve shows monthly Allied 108.!le8 of planes of
all type8 in the air war against Europe since July
1942. The columns represent aggregate 10_ during
the two-months' period of December/January and the
six-months' period of JulyfDecember in four SUCCClll-
sive years since 1940. The figuree were compiled from
offioial Gennan communiqu68. They include only
d finitely &lIC rta.ined 108IIC8 and not 108808 caUlled by
planll8 being interned in neutral countries or crl\8hing
unobserved by the defenders. The total number of
planes destroyed during the period covered by the
chart amounta to 11,912.
1943
man-ocoupied territory beoause hi fuel
h88 run out. Often he has to break
off the battle and abandon his bombers
when his fuel supply runs low. Obviously
the German fighters do not suffer from
such a handicap, as they rise from
airfields along the path of the bomb-
ers and near the target area and
need not worry about their fuel supply
in their maneuvers, being always a.ble to
la.nd on one of the many airfields within.'
short range.
Evidently the command of the US
Army Air Force now also prefers to order
major attaoks when bad weather 01' low
clouds are expeoted to hamper the de-
fense. Diversion raids are carried out
simultaneously, and sometimes night
raids by the British and daylight attacks
by the Americans have corne in rapid
succession, wherever possible from dif-
ferent direotions and against different.
objectives, in order to plit up and dis-
organize the German defense squadrons.
If the Allied bombing raids on Europe
have increased in cope and severity
during the past year, the defenders have
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BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS
ers 88 far into Reich territory 88 their
fuel supply would carry them. The de-
fenders continued to take an increasing
toll of US planes, reaching a olimax on
October 14, 1943, when, during an attack
on SohweinIurth, the record number of
139 planes W88 shot down. On that day,
the formation of "Flying Fortresses"
W88 accompanied by "Thunderbolt"
fighters 88 far 88 the Rubr district; after
that they were constantly attacked by
single- nnd twin-motored fighters and
rocket-bearing planes. Since that time
the Americans have been employing
more and more fighters to escort their
bombers. In recent weeks, bombers have
been protected by as many as twice or
three times their numher of fighters.
As a rule, the fighter escort flies in
three groups: one accompanying the
bombers to the objective,. the second
protecting the bomber oyer the target
region, a.nd the third accompanying them
on the way back. Of course this method
requires some very fine t.inling, an e pe-
ciaUy tioklish job in bad weat.her.
inee the Americans do not yet
have a sufficient number of long-
range fighters at their disposal,
they have had to make shift with
ordinary fight rs equipped with
extra fuel tanks fastened under
the WingR. To be able to curry
the same armament over long
distances in spite of this addi-
tional equipment, these fighters
have to put up with a reduced
speed. Moreover, since Ithe extra.
tanks are highly explosive, they
represent an added threat to the
fighter when it is attacked.
Consequently, tbe planes have an
automatic device which allows
the pilot quickly to cast off the
extra tanks before taking on a
German fighter. In that case the
plane must rely on its normal
fuel load and the pilot must keep
his eye on the fuel gauge if he
does not want to run the risk of
coming down on German or Ger-
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at least kept pace with them, if not
done better. This can be seen from our
chart of Allied losses in planes.
The significance of t.he chart is two-
fold. On the one hand, it indicates that,
seen as a whole, the monthly Allied plane
1088e8 show a rising tendency, apart from
temporary declines, especially during the
winter months, due chiefly to weather
conditions disadvantageous to the de-
fense. Actually the increase in air losses
during the past two years is even more
pronounced than indicated by the chart,
inasmuch 1\8 the percentage of heavy
bombers shot down has increased since
the beginning of the air ,var. On the
other hand, the mounting losses also
m(~rk the growing fury of the air raids
on the Continent and the increasing hard-
ship to which the civilian population of
Europe is exposed. It is difficult to
calculate the percentage of attacking
planes shot down. While both attackers
and defenders have had their ups and
downs, most recent developments seem to
have disproved predictions like that of
General Arnold, the Chief of the US
Army Air Force, who spoke last autumn
of the crumbling German resistance and
the declining plane output of the Reich.
The British and Americans have
pinned such high hopes on their air w.ar
against Europe that a very su~tant~
part of their war effort has gone mto It,
even to the neglect of other services. In
a recent i.el ue of the 11l'lL~trat.ed Lmulon
New8, Cyril Falls, the weH-known British
military commentator, quotes Sir James
Grigg, Secretary of State for War, as
having stated that British heavy bombers
have laid greater claim to the British
productive ca,pacity than everything ~l~at
was required by the rest of the Bntlsh
armed forces.
THE COST OF BOMBERS
I t has been estimated that the building
of one four-engined bomber devours
300,000 working hours or, calculated on
the basis of a lO-hour day including Sun-
days, one full mont.h's work of 1,000 men.
The mere replacement of the present aver-
age monthly loss of 1,000 heavy bomb-
ers, to which must be added at least
another 50 per cent for ordinary wear
and tear, emergency landings, crashing
on the way back or when landing, and
damages, would therefore require a stand-
ing labor army of at least 1,500,0~0 men
in the produotion plants. To thlS must
be added the labor needed for the re-
placement of fighter planes, quite a~art
from the requirements of the varlOU8
battle fronts in the Mediterranean and
Indo-Pacific areas. It goes without say-
ing that the expenditure for the con-
struction of manufacturing plants and of
the planes themselves runs into ~tro­
nomic figures, the cost of a four-cngUled
bomber being estimated at around
US $300 000-600,000. This would moon
the mo~thJy cost of some half-billion
US dollars in destroyed heavy bombers
alone. Quite aside from the huge I1mOlmt
of labor, a large quantity of vl~luable
material goes into the making of a four-
engined bomber weighing 25 tons. The
Germans have now taken to collecting
bomber wrecks systematically for their
scrap value and are obtaining conside~able
amounts of light metals, ball bearmgs,
crankshafts, vn.l ve pipes of specinl nlloy.
etc., in this way.
Air armadas need plenty of spacious
airdromes and ground inst.a.llations.
Nothing is known lI.bout the number of
landing fields constructed in the lJ.nitcd
Kingdom except that they are lo;(~ld to
have cost more than 3 billion US dollars.
A report dated August 6, 1942, from
Stockholm stated that 150 airdromes in
Britain had been placed lI.t the disposal
of the US air forces.
Besides pilots, radio operators, and
gun crews, air armadas also need a huge
number of men for ground personnel and
for supplies of aU sorts. Last winter, the
lllwtraled Lo7uUm N eW8 wrote that Bome
100 000 men are-directly or indirectly-en~ged in the preparing and carrying
out of an attack of 800 bombers. Ac-
cording to a recent article in Life, no less
than 38 men are kept busy in fitting out
one US four-engined bomber. There is
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the flying crew consisting of 4 officers
(pilot, co-pilot, bombardier, navigator)
and 5 men (2 radio operators, 2 engineers,
1 tail gmiller). The ground maintenance
crew of 11 (1 master sergeant and crew
chief, 8 engine mechanics, 2 airplane
frame mechanics) is supplemented by 7
specialists (1 each for instruments, radios,
armament, parachutes, propellers, and 2
for electrical equipment), these latter
being able to attend to several planes.
Then come the bomb-supply crew of 5
and the gas supply crew of 4, and fi-
nally I dispatcher and 1 weather man.
Considering further that bombs, munition,
and fuel have to be manufactured and
hauled over long distances, it is patent
that the Illustrated LondQn News is on
the conservative side. To what extent
manpower would be absorbed by a
super-large air force was made clear by
Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker, one of Ameri-
ca's foremost aviators, when he urged
the necessity of an American air force
consisting of 300,000 pilots, 5,000,000
mechanics, and some 10,000,000 in other
personnel.
The training of flying persOIUlel not
only involves considerable cost in time
and money but, what weighs more heavily,
entails a great deal of wear and tear on
machines and other equipment. The cost
of training a fighter pilot has been put
by British quarters at roughly USS 150,000
And 8.t about US$200,000 for the training
of a bomber pilot, while the training of
a gUliller would cost about one eighth of
that amount. As regards training casual-
ties, Time stated in its issue of January
24, 1944:
Hefore the war, 13 out of every 1,000 Army
student pilots were killed in training. Since the
war the fat.ality rMe hl.lli risen t,o 20 in every 1,000
•... In flyin~ tminini; the rat,e of fatal 8.C"idents is
about the BaIDe as before the war. fiut in combat
tr'Uining the mte has skyrocketed from 82 fl\tal
accidents in every million hours of flying to \82.
In combat training t·he fatality rate (a "fatal
crash" may cause one or many "fatalities") jumped
from 145 for each miUioll hours to 521.
However, it should be noted that
many US flight officers are only partially
trained and have to rely on formation
flying. They are directed by leader
planes mawled by pilots and navigators
whose schooling has taken from four to
six years. This explains why so many
US bombers go astray once their forma-
tions have been dispersed.
FUEL AND BOMBS
The consumption of fuel for mass at-
tacks over great distances is very con-
siderable. A single Lancaster bomber
requires some 6,000 liters for a flight to
the Ruhr district and back, i.e., a total
of about 900 kilometers. If Berlin .is to
be attacked, the distance increases \0
2,000 kilometers and the additional fuel
required makes it necessary to decrease
the bomb load. For their night attacks,
tho British have to provide fuel for their
bombers only; the Americans, on the
other hand, have to add the fuel used by
the fighter escort.
In a raid on the German capital, a
Boeing "Flying Fortress" of 4,800 hp
carries a bomb load of about 2 tons.
The accompanying fighters, some of which
are of the twin-engine type, add another
4,800 hp, so that each ton of bombs to
be dropped on Berlin requires 4,800 hp.
Assuming that 500 bombers and 1,500
escort fighters participate in a daylight
raid on Berlin, the fuel consumption
would be about as follows. At a cruising
speed of 350 kilometers per hour the flight
would take some 6 hours, consuming for
the greater part of the way about 50
per cent of the maximum power. Allow-
ing for detours, as well as for maximum
performance at starting and over the
target area, we shall take 70 per cent of
the maximum power as being the ap-
proximate average used for the entire
raid. Calculating a consumption of about
250 kilograms of fuel per 1,000 hp per
hour, the 4,800 hp of one bomber would
absorb 7,200 kilograms of fuel in six
hours or, at 70 per cent of the maximum
performance, about 5,000 kilograms, to
which must be added another 5,000 kilo-
grams of fuel used by the accompanying
fighters. 500 bombers and their fighter
escort would therefore consume some-
where around 5,000 tons of fuel, i.e.,
the contents of a fairsized tanker, for a
single raid on Berlin.
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THE ARMY BEHllo" WHAT OBJECT?
Before the recent intensification of the
air war, the British were staging some
eight to ten large-scale attack every
month in which, on an average, 'orne 750
four-engilled bombers took part; the
Americans, who made 10 to 15 raids
a. month, usually employed 400 8uper-
heavy bombers and 1,200 fighters on a.
venture. These figures allow us to esti-
mate that the number of Anglo-American
planes always kept in readiness for the
war against Europe amounts to about
3,500 bombcrs and 2,500 fighters, The
upkeep of such a force, calcull~ted on the
replacement figures of the first quarter
of 1944, would require, at a conservative
estimate, a standing army of more than
2 million men, viz.:
CoIUltruction of homber replacements 1,500,000 men
.. Ughtcr .. 100,000 ..
Ground personnel, manufacture of
ammunition, transportation of
lIupplies , . , 550,000 ..
lleteorological service. training of
flying and olher personnel. roo
placement of training planes. ctc. 100,000"
It mu t be borne in mind that the
cream of these men, namely the flying
crews, has been exposed to rising casualty
rates. As early as May 1943 the aviation
expert of the Evening Standard elltimated
the Br'it.i. h Air Force's 1088 in men at
47,000, If we disregard the relatively
small American losses up to that time
and add only tho approximaw casualties
suffered by the Anglo-Americans between
June 1, 1943, and April 30, 1944, in the
air war ovcr Europe, excluding the actual
battle fronts, wo arrive at a figure of
more than 100 000 men.
Thc types of airplanes most often
mentioned in reports on the Allied raids
are
US.-t Brili.th
4·engined bombers:
lloeing "Flyinl( Jo'ortro&l" "Lancaater"
COII~olid"led .. Liborator" .. \Vellington"
2·engined bombers:
Douglll8 "Doston" "Aiosquito"
2·enginod fightel'll:
Lockheed "Lightning"
Single·engined fightcrs:
Republio '"Thunderbolt" Hawker
North American "Mustang" "Typhooo"
There can be no doubt t111~t the Allied
command has brought the full wcight of
the air war to bear on the Continent in
order to crush the Reich. As fur as the
British Air Force was concerned, it was
out to terrorize the civilian population
and, by undermining the morule of the
home front, to break German resi tance.
The first ma..'l8 attacks on Liibeck. on the
night of March 28/29, 1942, whicb marked
the beginning of tbe large-, 'cale destruc-
tion of German cities, shows all the
features characterizing later raids. The
center of the towu was completely laid
waste. The churches, the town hall, the
old ga.tes. the historic na.rrow streets, were
converwd into a heap of rubble by
explosive and incendiary bOIll hs. Many
hundreds of civilians were killed and the
cultural treasures of centurieR destroyed .
Long is the list of German and other
European cities thus hit, but common to
aU these raid' is the desire to terrorize,
to unnerve the population.
Although some people in England still
pretend that the British are seeking to
bomb military objectives, they are con-
tradicted not only by the effects of their
bombi.ng but by the less pl'lldent utter-
ances of leading men and journals. On
October 24, 1942, Harold Balfour, Under-
secretary of State, stated that he hoped
the raids would "shatter tho morale and
the belief in the Fuhrer." In a debate in
the Hou!le of Lords, Dr. Bell, the Bishop
of Chichester, regretted the indiscriminate
bombing of big cities like Berlin and
Hamburg. He sa.id it had been admitted
that the objective of such raids was the
complete destruction of these towns,
which could hardly be rcgardcd as a
legitimate act of war. According to the
air expert of the Daily Express, British
airmen dropped at least iO per cent of
their bombs in their night attacks on
Berli.n without seeing their target.s. The
very idea of "area bombing" excludes
the target bombing of military objectives.
The US Army Air Force proclaimed
the purpose of its dayligbt raids to be
the destruction of the Reich's production
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centers, boasting 88 it does of the "best
bombing sight in the world '; it too,
however, has. aimed in the main at res-
idential districts and city centers. If'
one considers that the US bomber squad·
rons usually appear at great altitudes
or sook cover in clo'lds whenever po88ible,
there can be no question of their taking
proper aim. In February 1944, Lieu-
tenant Colin Bednal, the Daily Mail'8
air expert, admitted that the Americall8,
who had arrived in Britain with delicate
instruments in order to carry out pre-
cision bombing by daylight, had given
up the idea and were now going in for
"area bornbing."
THE GERMAN DEFENSE
How has it been possible for the Ger-
ma·ns to infli t such telling losses on the
raiders? Naturally, large forces have
been mobilized on the German ide too.
But they can hardly be compared to the
forces uscd by the Anglo-Americans.
First of all, fighter planes can be manu-
factured far more easily than bombers
and are manned by one or two men.
Moreover, as most of the battles take
place over German territory, Gennan
losses in Bying persOlmel are compara-
tively small, 88 those airmen who must
bail out do not fall into the hands of the
enemy. And secondly, the German anti-
aircraft bll.tteries Me manned partly by
boys not yet of military nge, thus effect-
ing a considerable saving in manpower.
The main weapon of the German anti-
aircraft artillery is the famous 8.8-centi-
meter gun, but thero are other types of
even larger caliber. New searchlights
with a. dia.met~r of 2 meters cast IL beam
of 15 kilometers and, if combined in
batteries, penetrate as far IlS 20 kilo-
meters. The number of AA guns em-
ployed in the defense of Reich territory
is unknown, but in the middle of 1943
an American estimate already put it at
30,000. After the daylight raid on Berlin
on April 29, 1944, one American gunner
said on his return: 'The flak was ter-
rific. . . . Berlin must have flak guns
in every street, every house, and every
apartment. "
Among the Gennan fighter planes, the
Messerscbmitt 109 and the Focke-Wulf
190 are single-engined, while the Messer-
schmitt 110 is twin-engined. The first Ger-
man night-fighter planes were also twin-
engined two-seaters; but a new single-
engined single-seater night fighter has been
developed and proved successful, It is
nickna.med the "Wild Boar." New tactics
have been tried out, just as new arms
have been employed against the raiders.
Rocket cannons hs.ve been mounted on
twin-engined fighters, firing explosive
salvoes as well as fog rockets which
caused some of the attackers to collide.
AmeriQan pilots reported fire bombs being
towed by German planes by means of
cables and being exploded near the
"Flying Fortresses." Night raiders found
themselves spotted in the light of whole
series of flares forming luminous paths,
in which t,hey were attacked by the
Germans. Herc is the description of an
American daylight raid aa it appeared in
Time, January 24, 1944:
Almost from the start, the mission was hell in
the heAvens. The G nnons aLtacked over Hoi-
land's Zuider Zoe, nover stopped for Ion,.. They
used tactics IUld lItrongth which they mu,,~ h"vo
been cautiously hoarding for pre·i"nnU<ion bllttles.
A f1igh~ of 32 MC!'.'lCr8Chmitts and F'ockc·Wulf8
tackled 1\ leading squadron oi Thundorbolts_ Other
German fJghters bored straight t.hrough at tho
bombers. First. four f"ocke,'VulJs; then 30; then
12; then they poured in, 8lamming through tho
tight gun-etudde<! bomber formation withouL even
rolling ovor,
Tho fil'llt enemy waves had the job of breaking
up ~he bomber sqUadrollll. Rocket.firing plan_
et.aye<! out of gun rnnge, firer! broQd8ides from
formation. To the U.S. crews, the battle lit thiil
stage had a weird naval quAlity. A Fortr.'>l8
gunner wntched a grllup of 18 twin.eugined M .
1108 circle from tho rear, fly up in line thn'e-
quarton of a mile away; then. like torpedo boats,
execute 8 superb gO-degree turn lUld lob their
rockets simultaneously-"a broadside of rocket..
LhaL _mod to bursL in an unonding line of rod
and )'ellow fire." Some bomben were under
continuous attack for 88 much 'Ui 90 minutes; 2-'
hourtJ lat.cr the men were 8till tense a.nd grim-<lyed,
haunted by ~he strain of baLtle.
PILOTS' NERVES
This last reference points to an ent.irely
new aspect affecting the problem of
flying personnel. In a recent article in
Air New8, Frederick Sondem, Jr., de-
scribes the work and experiences of
physicia.llB assigned to the American air
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squadrons in Britain. The strain on
bomber pilota is apparently particularly
great, and after 100 hours of bomber
flying the physicians have to look for
symptoms of overstrained nerves in the
pilots. One of the doctors explained this
fact as follows: let us say that the task
requires 10 hours, 5 hours each way.
Have you any idea of what it means to
fly il hours with every nerve aa taut aa
a fiddle string? When the pilot ap-
proaches his goal, hell is let 1008e below,
abovo, and around him; but he must get
thero with the accuracy of a calculating
machine and provide his bombardier
wit.h the ll.bsolutely straight course needed
for using the bomb sight and releaaing
the bombs. Then comes the nerve-
wracking job of looking out for damaged
comrades who need protection while they
try to limp home. The following 5
hours, the flight back-in constant danger
of fighter att-acks--are endless. Figure
out all that he has used up in nerve
strain, and realize that all this time the
pilot has had no relief for his tension.
The fighter pilot can at least see what
he hita, he can do a lot of fancy flying
and in this way blow off some of the
steam in his nervous system. But the
bomoor pilot, as well as the rest of the
crew, must sit and sit for hours on end,
waiting for the few m.inutes of con-
centra.ted bell. Look at a bomber crew
when they come back from an assignment.
The information officer whose joh it is
to squeeze dctails about the flight from
these fellows usually has a. hard time
pumping them. They have not the loast
inclination to talk, all they do is sit and
gulp down their food, fall into bed, and
sleep well into the next day.
The doctor told Sondern of a typical
case. In one pilot he noticed signs of
overstrained nerves and suggested that
he should take a short vu.cation. The
pilot, however, was reluctant, as he was
afraid of spoiling his chu.nces of long
leave if he took a vacation now. The
physician continued: "I gave in-a mis-
take I shall never make again. The
following day came the breakdo\\'n, in
the midst of the attack. He simply lost
control over his plane, Bew around like
a wounded bird, and had his ship badly
shot up by the Luftwaffe. Not until the
last moment, when he was six or ten
feet above the water, did he get hold of
his plane again and somehow managed
to get home. 'Doctor,' he said to me,
'the devil knows what happened. Sud-
denly I started to sweat and tremble
liko an aspen leaf. I waan't afraid, but
I felt as if I had turned into jelly.'" The
doctor added: "TIlls fellow will never
be able to touch a plano again. His
nerves have cracked."
AND THE RESULT?
What effect have these gigantic effQrts
on the part of the Brit.ish and Americans
bad? As for the German supplies in
arms and other war material, the Allies
themselves have not been ablo to claim
any noticeable decrease as the result of
their air raids. And as for the econd
object of the raids, the breaking of the
civilian morale and tho German people's
will of resistance, we shall quote from
a recent article appearing in the Neue
Zurcher Zeilung, a Swiss daily that can
hardly be acoused of pro-German senti-
ments. In a lengthy description of how
Berlin was bearing up under the almost
continuous raids since November 22,
1943, the Berlin correspondent of the
paper writes :
After the large.scale raidll of the last fow months.
enouKh experienco has been gained to jWltiJy a
detllilOt1 observation of the political eff8(lt of the
air Wtir. 'Ye do not know what the futurA h08
in Ktore; but at any rat.e. ono thing is' oertain: 80
far the morale of the population h88 sLood up
well. The will to fight haa remained unimpaired.
Any impartial ob8erver is bound ta confirm this.
Of course, the Government is faced by numerous
diffioultiOll in organization and war economics; but
ito political position h88 not been weakened-in
fact, in a certain 88n86 it hM oven been IItrength.
ened. For tho VMt majority of tho bombing
victims believe that victory alone wiJI give them
back at lea.st a po.rt of what they havo lost. Thio
linko th88e people even closer to t.he fata of Nation.
al·Sociali8ffi. It provides them with Mle energy to
exert their utmost efTort for tho war which. inciden.
tally. ne Gennan. whatever his political convlctions
may be, would "'ish to _ lost. The British have,
politically speaking, definitely lost a lot of ground,
a fact which is only natural. A family losing all its
possoll.'lions through a bomb directs most of its
ClU'8e8 against thollO who havo dropped it.
